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Hypnotically Induced Testimony:
Credibility versus Admissibility
In Harding v. State,1 the testimony of a witness who had undergone
hypnosis prior to trial to restore lost memory was ruled admissible into
evidence. After this seminal decision by the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, a line of cases in other courts admitted testimony induced by
pretrial hypnosis.2 Finding various ways to reject the use of pretrial hyp-
nosis as an aid to memory recall, however, some state courts recently
have broken the trend toward the admission of hypnotically induced
testimony.3 The split among courts on this issue was widened considerably
by another Maryland case, Polk v. State.4 The Maryland court retreated
from its trend-setting decision in Harding by holding that hypnosis was
not a generally acceptable scientific technique.5 As a result of the Polk
decision, agreement among jurisdictions on the proper role of hypnosis
in the law may be difficult to achieve.
After providing some background information on hypnosis, this note
analyzes the recent case law on the admissibility of testimony induced
by pretrial hypnosis. This note will conclude that the recent court opi-
nions rejecting the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony are
not based on sound legal reasoning.' Further, the note will argue that
5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1968).
See United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979);
Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp.,
503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974); Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d 240 (1974); People
v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979); State v. Temoney, 45 Md. App.
569, 414 A.2d 240 (1980); State v. McQueen, 29 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978); State v. Brom,
8 Or. App. 598, 494 P.2d 434 (1972); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971).
1 Some courts have applied the test for scientific reliability announced'in Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The standard articulated by the court in Frye demands
that the technique have gained general acceptance in the field in which it belongs. See,
e.g., Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041 (1981); State v. Mack, - Minn. _,
292 N.W.2d 764 (1980). Although Frye was not cited, the Court of Appeals of Michigan
applied the Frye test in People v. Tait, 99 Mich. App. 19, 297 N.W.2d 853 (1980). Other
courts have based their rejection of the use of hypnotically induced testimony on the
unreliability of the technique without applying the Frye test or any other standard. See,
e.g., State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981); State v. LaMountain, 125 Ariz.
547, 611 P.2d 551 (1980). Compare State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981), in which
the court rejected the use of pretrial hypnosis based on the particular facts of the case,
but set up procedural safeguards to insure the reliability of the process for use in future
cases.
48 Md. App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041 (1981).
Id. at 394, 427 A.2d at 1048.
See note 3 supra. Several commentators have criticized the use of hypnotically induced
testimony and expressed a concern about dangers associated with the techniques, but have
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the case law reveals a need for a uniform set of procedural safeguards
for the use of hypnosis, rather than a blanket exclusion of hypnotically
induced testimony.7 Finally, the note concludes that the central issue raised
by hypnotically induced testimony is credibility, rather than admissibility.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF HYPNOSIS
What Hypnosis Is
Since its development in the eighteenth century, hypnosis has generated
a number of legends and myths.8 Writers have defined hypnosis
differently;9 however, the current lack of knowledge about complex brain
mechanisms makes it impossible to construct a sound scientific theory
of hypnosis."0 Nevertheless, the increased use of hypnosis as a therapeutic
tool has encouraged more concentrated research and, as a result, the abili-
ty to explain the hypnotic process has increased tremendously."
tried to design and articulate methods that can be used by courts, lawyers, and hypnotists
to mitigate such dangers. See generally Herman, The Use of Hypno-Induced Statements in
Criminal Cases, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1964); Teitelbaum, Admissibility ofHypnoticallyAdduced
Evidence and the Arthur Nebb Case, 8 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205 (1963); Note, Hypnosis in Court:
A Memory Aid for Witnesses, 1 GA. L. REV. 268 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Note, Hypnosis
in Court]. Although the issue to be dealt with here is practical hypnosis to restore lost
memory and not the use of hypnosis inside the courtroom, this note's discussion of pro-
cedural safeguards could apply to both uses of the technique. See Foster & Spector, Ad-
missibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law of Evidence Susceptible?, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 567
(1977); Fountain, Hypnosis: Understanding Its Use in the Criminal Process, 11 TEx. TECH.
L. REV. 113 (1979); Comment, Hypno-Induced Statements: SafeguardsforAdmissibility, 99 LAw
& Soc. ORD. 99 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Safeguards]; Note, Hypnosis as a Defense
Tactic, 1 TOL. L. REV. 691 (1969); Comment, Refreshing the Memory of a Witness Through Hyp-
nosis, 5 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 266 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Refreshing the
Memory]; Note, Admissibility of Present Recollection Restored by Hypnosis, 15 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 357 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Present Recollection].
' One commentator concludes that hypnosis should be used only "where it is essential
to 'unlock' the memory of a key witness:' Dilloff, The Admissibility ofHypnotically Influenced
Testimony, 4 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 1, 23 (1977). Another writer "argues that testimony by previous-
ly hypnotized witnesses should never be admitted into evidence." Diamond, Inherent Prob-
lems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CAL. L. REV. 313,315 (1980).
' Mesmer supposedly discovered hypnosis in the 18th century, but such techniques were
used by many primitive civilizations long before Mesmer. See generally M. TEITELBAUM,
HYPNOSIS INDUCTION TECHNIQUES 3-4 (1963); see also W. BRYAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HYPNOSIS
(1962).
9 See M. TEITELBAUM, supra note 8, at 8-15; L. WOLBERG, HYPNOSIS: IS IT FOR YOU? 50-60
(1972). The American Medical Association Council on Mental Health has defined hypnosis
as a temporary condition of altered attention in the subject which may be induced by another
person and in which a variety of phenomena may appear spontaneously or in response
to verbal or other stimuli. These phenomena include alterations in consciousness and memory,
increased susceptibility to suggestion, and the production in the subject of responses and
ideas unfamiliar to him in his usual state of mind. Council on Mental Health, Medical Use
of Hypnosis, 168 J.A.M.A. 186, 187 (1958).
" L. WOLBERG, supra note 9, at 50.
" D. CHEEK & L. LECRON, CLINICAL HYPNOTHERAPY (1968); Fromm, Quo Vadis Hypnosis?
Predicting the Future Trends in Hypnotic Research, in HYPNOSIS RESEARCH DEVELOPMENTS
AND PERSPECTIVES 575-86 (E. Fromm & R. Shor eds. 1972).
HYPNOTIC TESTIMONY
While under hypnosis the subject experiences physical manifestations
such as an increase in rate of breathing and heartbeat along with
drowsiness and fluttering of the eyelids. 2 The subject in a hypnotic trance
will respond to cues or suggestions by the hypnotist. The manner in which
the subject responds is called suggestibility. 3 If the hypnotist suggests
that the subject is in the middle of a desert, the subject responds by
altering his perception of reality in an attempt to experience the sugges-
tion mentally. ' Although there is a heightened level of suggestibility, the
subject is not completely under the control of the hypnotist.'"
Because a trance cannot be induced without the consent of the subject,' 6
the success of hypnosis depends on the relationship between the hyp-
notist and the subject." In order to make the subject more comfortable,
and also to measure the level of susceptibility to hypnotic trance, the
hypnotist will inquire into the subject's experience with hypnosis, including
fears or expectations. 8 The subject's response to suggestion depends, in
part, on the depth of the hypnotic trance. 9
One commentator suggests that there are three basic stages of
hypnosis,20 while others contend there are as many as ten different levels
of trance.2' For the sake of simplicity, no more than four such stages will
be discussed here. The first is the hypnoidal stage, characterized by a
light trance in which the subject loses control of localized voluntary
motions. 2 If the hypnotist tells the "subject he will be unable to open
his eyes, the subject will be unable to open his eyes."' When the subject
experiences a loss of some senses, he is in the second stage. While the
sense of touch remains, the subject will be unable to feel pain.' In this
medium trance stage, upon suggestion by the hypnotist, the subject will
be unable to remember his name.l Positive hallucinations and loss of both
touch and sense of pain characterize the third stage,26 while the ability
"See Foster & Spector, supra note 6, at 571.
, Id. at 570.
This is an example of the subject's alteration of consciousness by response to the
stimuli provided by the hypnotist's suggestions. While in the hypnotic trance, the subject
will feel less tension and will be able to relax to a greater extent than possible without
the aid of hypnosis. See D. CHEEK & L. LECRON, supra note 11, at 13-14.
, See L. WOLBERG, supra note 9, at 63.
16 If a person is determined not to be hypnotized, usually he cannot be. L. WOLBERG,
supra note 9, at 61.
" See generally M. TEITELBAUM, supra note 8, at 19-20.
" See generally Foster & Spector, supra note 6, at 571.
"Id.
Comment, Refreshing the Memory, supra note 6, at 270.
" M. TEITELBAUM, supra note 8, at 30, cited in Note, Refreshing the Memory, supra note
6, at 270 n.22; see, e.g., H. ARONS, HYPNOSIS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 137 (1967) (six levels).
2 Foster & Spector, supra note 6, at 571.
"Id.
" Id. at 571-72.
"Id. at 572.
"Id.
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to produce negative hallucinations is characteristic of the fourth stage,
in which the subject will be "unable to perceive objects that are actually
present."' Collapsing the third and fourth stages into one category called
"deep trance," there are three basic stages of trance: light trance, medium
trance, and deep trance. Although the subject's vulnerability to sugges-
tion increases with each progressive stage, at no time is the subject com-
pletely under the control of the hypnotist 2 or unaware of what is being
suggested.'
Techniques for Memory Recall
The three most important techniques for the restoration of memory
are post-hypnotic suggestion, age regression, and hypermnesia. The hyp-
notist using post-hypnotic suggestion suggests, during the trance, that
upon awakening the subject will remember the event forgotten.3 ' Because
the subject interprets the suggestion literally,' the suggestion must be
worded carefully." For example, if the purpose of the trance is to restore
memory of a person's facial features, the hypnotist must be careful to
make the suggestion explicit. Suggesting that the subject remember
height, weight, and* general appearance may not restore memory of
detailed facial features.
Instead of suggesting that the event be remembered upon awakening,
age regression allows the subject to relive the event mentally, as if it
were presently happening.34 On this basis, age regression is argued to
be more accurate than testimony given in the waking state.3 If the sub-
ject is regressed to the past and told to relive it, the focus is not on recall-
ing memory, but on replacing blank memory cells with the actual event
as it is relived. It is "a special case of resurrection of memory traces."'"
Arguably, memory refreshed by the use of age regression is free from
conscious or subconscious distortions because the witness is testifying
from the mental present. 7
"Hypermnesia is a special case of remembrance."'' While under the hyp-
notic trance, the subject receives instructions from the hypnotist and ex-
2Id.
" L. WOLBERG, s8upra note 9, at 63.
M. TEITELBAUM, supra note 8, at 30.
o Foster & Spector, supra note 6, at 572.
31 Note, Present Recollection, supra note 6, at 360.
1 Foster & Spector, supra note 6, at 573.
" See R. REIFF & M. SCHEERER, MEMORY AND HYPNOTIC AGE REGRESSION 90 (1959).
3 M. TEITELBAUM, supra note 8, at 114; L. WOLBERG, supra note 9, at 139.
See W. BRYAN, supra note 8, at 196-97; Note, Hypnosis in Court, supra note 6, at 274.
R. REIFF & M. SCHEERER, supra note 33, at 52.
See generally Note, Present Recollection, supra note 6, at 361.
R. REIFF & M. SCHEERER, supra note 33, at 34.
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periences an autobiographic index '- the experience of personal continuity
through time.'0 What is remembered is always experienced as past
events.' 1 Because they are similar techniques, age regression and hyperm-
nesia suffer from the same problems.2 The hypnotist gives the subject
all instructions and elicits all information during the trance without any
suggestion that the information is to be remembered after the trance. 43
Thus, the conscious memory of the subject may not be improved." Upon
awakening, the subject may not have any present recollection of the events
remembered while hypnotized.
5
THE ACCEPTANCE OF HYPNOTICALLY INDUCED TESTIMONY
Trend-Setting Case Law
In 1897 an American court for the first time dealt with the use of hyp-
nosis as an evidentiary tool. When an expert hypnotist was introduced
as a witness by the defense in an attempt to enter into evidence the results
of a hypnotic session with the defendant, the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia in People v. Ebanks46 responded by stating that hypnosis was not
recognized by the law of the United States.47 Ebanks set the early trend
for the relationship between the legal community and hypnosis.
Affirming a lower court decision that excluded a hypnotist's testimony
that the defendant had declared his innocence while hypnotized, the
Supreme Court of North Dakota stated in 1950 that "[n]o case has been
cited by either party relating to the admissibility of the evidence prof-
fered and no case has been found. We think the evidence was clearly
inadmissible ... ." Thus, the advent of hypnosis as an evidentiary tool
in the legal community was marred by its rejection in the courts; eight-
een years later, however, hypnotically induced testimony was admitted
into evidence in a state court. 9
39 Id.
" I& at 25.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 65.
4 See Note, Present Recollection, supra note 6, at 361.
44 Id.
45 Id.
41117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897). While under hypnosis, the defendant, who was being
tried for murder, denied his guilt. Id. at 665-66; 49 P. at 1053. It was this evidence that
the defense sought to enter. Id. Even in the absence of the court's statement about hyp-
nosis, the evidence may have been excludable on hearsay grounds.
47 Id
48 77 N.D. 860, 888, 46 N.W.2d 508, 522 (1950).
" Between 1950 and 1968, there were cases that dealt with hypnosis, but not the issue
of admissibility of testimony induced by pretrial hypnosis. E.g., Cornell v. Superior Court,
52 Cal. 2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1969) (court allowed defense attorney to have client examined
by hypnotist, but results were not offered as evidence); People v. Busch, 56 Cal. 2d 868,
1982]
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Harding v. State-' considered the admissibility of testimony induced by
pretrial hypnosis. Convicted of both assault with intent to commit rape
and assault to commit murder,51 the defendant appealed, arguing that the
testimony of the victim had been hampered by pretrial hypnosis' and
that the hypnotist did not possess the requisite qualifications to be cer-
tified as an expert.' The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed
the conviction of the defendant and upheld the admission of the victim's
testimony and the testimony of the hypnotist as expert.'
One critic of Harding argues that because the hypnotist who testified
at the trial performed the hypnosis, it is hard to imagine that he would
deny the reliability of the technique.- Nevertheless, the court was satisfied
that a proper foundation had been laid." One commentator believes that
366 P.2d 314, 16 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1961) (court refused to allow doctor's testimony concerning
results of hypnotic session because no proper foundation had been laid for reliability of
hypnosis and qualifications of doctor to perform hypnosis had not been established); Peo-
ple v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1963) (court allowed psychiatrist's
testimony concerning state of mind of defendant based on hypnosis, because proper foun-
dation had been laid for the reliability of the technique and qualifications of hypnotist).
In these cases, the test for admission of testimony related to hypnosis became an objective
standard based on laying a proper foundation for the reliability of the technique and the
qualifications of the hypnotist. 59 Cal. 2d at 733, 382 P.2d at 39, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 231; 56
Cal. 2d at 874, 366 P.2d at 319-20; 16 Cal. Rptr. at 903-04.
5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1968).
51 After refusing to have sexual relations with Harding, the victim was shot and left
on the roadside. Id. at 232, 246 A.2d at 304. Harding later returned and raped her. Id.
at 235, 246 A.2d at 305-06. The victim was found, in a state of shock, on the side of the
road two or three miles from where she was shot. Id. at 233, 246 A.2d at 304.
1 While in the hospital, the victim could not remember some of the details about the
incident. Id. at 234, 246 A.2d at 305. After being released from the hospital, she was hyp-
notized. Id. As a result, her memory was restored and she identified the defendant as
the one who shot and raped her. Id. at 235, 246 A.2d at 305-06. This was her testimony
at trial. Id. The hypnotist also testified concerning the hypnotic process. Id. at 237-44, 246
A.2d at 306-10. A critic of the Harding decision pointed out that besides semen found on
the victim, the testimony induced by pretrial hypnosis constituted the bulk of the evidence
for conviction. See Diamond, supra note 7, at 322.
5 Md. App. at 235, 246 A.2d at 306.
' Id. at 247, 246 A.2d at 312.
Dilloff, supra note 7, at 20. Mr. Dilloff argued that the hypnotist was not impartial
because he was hired by the police; further, the fact that the hypnosis took place at a
police barrack made the entire procedure biased. Id. at 7-8, 19. The victim was also inter-
viewed, while under hypnosis, by a state trooper whose only interest was in identifying
the assailant. See id. at 19. The probability of confabulation was increased because the
witness changed her story after hypnosis. Id. Counsel for the suspect was not present
at the time of the hypnosis; there was no chance to cross-examine the subject during hyp-
nosis. Id.
' 5 Md. App. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306. The court noted that the hypnotist was a clinical
psychologist employed as chief clinical psychologist at a state hospital and that he had
qualified to testify as an expert in the field of psychology in Baltimore and in a number
of Maryland counties. Id. at 235-36; 246 A.2d at 306. "[H]e was familiarized with hypnosis
or hypnotherapy as a form of treatment." Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306. Finally, the court
pointed out that the record of the trial court disclosed that psychologists and the medical
profession used hypnosis as an analytical tool and technique to assist patients in recover-
ing lost memory. Id.
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"if the Harding trial and appellate courts had been presented a more ac-
curate description of the nature of hypnosis and the extreme vulnerability
of the subject to suggestion, they might have been less disposed to admit
the evidence." 7 The record of the trial court, which was examined on
appeal, however, indicated that the hypnotist was questioned as to the
suggestibility of the subject under hypnosis." Although he admitted the
subject was vulnerable to limited suggestibility, the hypnotist, in the opin-
ion of the court, was able to show that the technique was reliable enough
to justify admission of the testimony. 9
The defendant's objection also was based on the fact that the hypnotist
had not graduated from a school of hypnotism.' Citing the fact that for-
mal training in hypnosis was provided in the hypnotist's "education as
a psychologist and his use of hypnosis for four years,"6 the court con-
cluded that the trial judge properly admitted his testimony., Formal train-
ing is unnecessary. as long as the record shows that the hypnotist is
"possessed 'of any knowledge or information which would elevate his opi-
nion above the level of conjecture or personal reaction.'6" With respect
to this analysis of expert testimony, the court is supported by Federal
Rule of Evidence 702. This rule states that experts may be qualified by
"skill, experience, training, or education;"" thus it is the presence of
specialized knowledge that is the issue, not the source of that knowledge.
After undergoing pretrial hypnosis, the victim in Harding testified that
the defendant was the one who shot and raped her 6s Because the witness
testified from her present recollection, the court framed the issue as one
of credibility rather than admissibility.' Hypnosis was used as a device
to refresh memory and the court properly left to the jury the question
of the weight to be given the resulting testimony. 7
The victim's testimony at trial, after hypnosis, differed from her prior
statements. 8 One commentator suggests that these inconsistencies are
evidence of possible confabulation-filling in gaps in memory with
fantasy. 9 While confabulation is possible, witnesses who have not
undergone hypnosis have been known to make prior inconsistent
Diamond, supra note 7, at 323.
" 5 Md. App. at 240, 246 A.2d at 308.
See id.
'o Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
61 Id.
z Id.
Id. (quoting Hewitt v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 243 Md. 574, 585, 221 A.2d 894,
902 (1966)).
FED. R. EVID. 702.
5 Md. App. at 235, 246 A.2d at 305-06.
" Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
'7Id.
" See id. at 233, 235, 246 A.2d at 304-05.
' Dilloff, supra note 7, at 19.
1982]
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statements, and the jury in such instances is charged with giving the
testimony its proper weight. There is no reason for the inconsistent
statements of a witness who has undergone hypnosis to be treated any
differently. Although warnings about the dangers inherent in the use of
hypnosis are desirable, they are necessary only to the extent that juries
and courts should be warned about possible defects in any form of
testimony.
A major criticism of hypnotically induced testimony is that the hyp-
notic subject, after awakening, cannot "recognize that a suggestion im-
planted intentionally or unintentionally by the hypnotist is not the pro-
duct of his own mind."'" This being true, the most vigorous cross-
examination will not reveal the existence of suggestion to the witness
or the interrogator." The shortcomings associated with hypnotically in-
duced testimony are not unique, however. When a witness testifies from
his own memory, without the influence of hypnosis, there is also a danger
of confabulation, vulnerability to suggestion, and distortion of memory.72
Regardless of the presence or absence of pretrial hypnosis, a witness may
be unable to recognize that a suggestion is not a function of his own mind.
Assuming that testimony taken from two witnesses, only one of whom
has been subjected to pretrial hypnosis, is the result of a suggestion im-
planted by the interrogator, the effect of the suggestion on both witnesses
is less reliable testimony. The question becomes the degree to which the
testimony is unreliable, which is a question of fact properly left for the
jury.7 3
In order to facilitate the factfinding duty of the jury, the court in
Harding gave a special instruction relating to the testimony induced by
pretrial hypnosis. The jury was warned against giving such testimony
any greater weight than any other testimony heard at trial.74 Moreover,
the record contains evidence of some of the safeguards recommended by
70 Diamond, supra note 7, at 334.
It is very difficult for human beings to recognize that some of their own
thoughts might have been implanted and might not be the product of their
own volition. It is only with the severely mentally disturbed, as in schizophrenia
and in obsessive-compulsive neuroses, that one's thoughts and resultant
behavior are experienced as alien. Normally, mental processes are rationalized
and experienced as the product of free will, even when it should be obvious
that they are not.
Id. at 333-34.
" Id. at 334.
7 See generally Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The GAP from
Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1079 (1973); Marshall, Marquis & Oskamp, Effects of Kind
of Question and Atmosphere of Interrogation on Accuracy and Completeness of Testimony,
84 HARV. L. REV. 1620 (1971); Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You?: Expert Psychological
Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identifiwation, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969 (1977).
" See generally 5 Md. App. at 244, 246 A.2d at 310.
" 5 Md. App. at 244, 246 A.2d at 310.
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commentators on pretrial hypnosis."8 For this reason, Harding has been
recognized for its appreciation of the problems peculiar to hypnotically
induced testimony.7" Harding provided the cornerstone for other courts
inclined to be favorably disposed to the development of hypnosis as an
aid to memory recall.
Growth in Acceptance of Hypnotically Induced Testimony
Only three years after the decision in Harding, a line of cases upheld
the use of pretrial hypnosis to restore lost memory. Citing Harding, the
Oregon Court of Appeals in State v. Jorgensen" approved such use of hyp-
nosis. As a result of trauma, the witness in Jorgensen had lost all memory
of the events of the crime.78 A combination of hypnosis and sodium amytol
partially restored lost memory."
Jorgensen used much the same language as the Harding opinion in sup-
port of admitting the testimony. The "witnesses gave their testimony
.. in open court and were subjected to prolonged and rigorous cross-
examination by defendant's counsel before the jury."' This worked as
a safeguard against the dangers of hypnotically induced testimony. The
court did not "believe that the fact [witnesses] had been subjected to cer-
tain psychiatric procedures ... prior to testifying, which were fully dis-
closed in the evidence, would be a basis for disallowing their testimony."1
The court held that objections raised by the defendant went to the weight
of the testimony rather than its admissibility:' "Credibility of... witnesses
[is] for the jury."
,' The evidence adduced at trial was as follows:
(1) the hypnosis procedure was fully exposed in the evidence; (2) the man who
induced the hypnosis was a professional psychologist and gave his opinion
that there was no reason to doubt the truth of the witness' statement; (3)
there was sufficient corroboration of the witness' testimony; (a) male sperm
was found in the victim's vagina, (b) the accused was one of two males shown
to have been found when the crime was committed, (c) the accused was seen
in a station wagon immediately prior to the time the crime was committed.
In addition a precautionary instruction was given.
Id. at 247, 246 A.2d at 312. For a commentator's recommendation of similar safeguards,
see e.g., Comment, Safeguards, supra note 6.
"1 See, e.g., Note, Present Recollection, supra note 6, at 367.
7, 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971) (defendant appealed from conviction of one count
of second degree murder and one count of first degree murder).
"' Id. at 8, 492 P.2d at 315.
79 Id.
Id. at 9, 492 P.2d at 315.
" Id.
12 Id. It would appear from the language of the opinion that Harding did "set the trend
for subsequent rulings that pretrial hypnotism affects credibility but not admissibility of
the evidence," Diamond, supra note 7, at 322.
U 8 Or. App. at 9, 492 P.2d at 315. See also State v. Brom, 8 Or. App. 598, 494 P.2d
434 (1972) (expressly followed Jorgensen although no discussion of hypnotic evidence was
contained in the opinion).
19821
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In Wyller v. Fairchild,84 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that hypnosis was not inherently unreliable. After
pretrial hypnosis was used to restore lost memory, the testimony of a
witness was admitted into evidence. Much of the language of the opinion
was borrowed from the Jorgensen and Harding opinions. The court em-
phasized the cross-examination of the witness and the availability of a
precautionary instruction, which the defendant had not requested.' "The
Court thus implicitly recognized that cross-examination of the hypnotist
is essential to expose possible suggestion [and] to expose failure on the
part of the hypnotist to take appropriate steps to assure that the subject
was actually hypnotized."86
The next state court to defend pretrial hypnosis against its critics was
the Supreme Court of North Carolina in State v. McQueen.8 7 McQueen was
decided four years after the decision in Wyller. Following the courts in
Maryland, Oregon, and the Ninth Circuit, McQueen held that testimony
induced by pretrial hypnosis was admissible. The court distinguished hyp-
nosis from lie-detector tests, which invade the province of the jury by
attempting to prove the credibility or noncredibility of the testimony
offered.8 In contrast, hypnosis, as it was used in McQueen, only aided
the witness in restoring lost memory.89 Citing State v. Peacock,® a case
in which the use of memoranda for the purpose of refreshing memory
was involved, the court in McQueen stated:
It is quite immaterial by what means the memory is quickened; it
may be a song, or a face, or a newspaper item, or a writing of some
character. It is sufficient that by some mental operation, however
mysterious, the memory is stimulated to recall the event, for when
set in motion it functions quite independently of the actuating cause.
In the opinion of the court, although hypnosis was an unusual device to
refresh memory, the legal effect was the same as if a document had been
used to revive memory.2 The court apparently drew no distinction be-
tween hypnosis and any other memory recall device.
On the grounds that the court failed to employ proper procedural
safeguards, McQueen has been severely criticized. One commentator has
argued that the court did nothing to insure that the testimony of the
503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974).
" See Note, Present Recollection, supra note 6, citing 503 F.2d at 509-10.
w Id.
295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1979) (defendant appealed conviction of two counts of
murder in the first degree).
Id. at 121-22, 244 S.E.2d at 429.
' See id.
236 N.C. 137, 72 S.E.2d 612 (1952).
91 295 N.C. at 122, 244 S.E.2d at 429.
' Id. at 121, 244 S.E.2d at 428.
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witness was free of suggestion. ' However, the court stated that the defen-
dant did not seek to cross-examine the witness concerning the hypnotic
procedure.94 Furthermore, no effort was made by the defense to call the
hypnotist, who was available, to testify.95 Although prior to trial a tape
of the entire hypnotic session was available, the defense apparently did
not choose either to question the technical aspects of the procedure or
to view the tape." The defense failed to attack the reliability of hypnosis
with regard to the admissibility or credibility of the testimony.
One year after Wyller and McQueen, the Court of Apleals for the Ninth
Circuit made an important pronouncement with respect to the founda-
tion necessary for hypnotically induced testimony. In United States v.
Awkard, 7 the defendants were convicted of a prison murder.98 The govern-
ment's witnesses had undergone pretrial hypnosis to refresh their recollec-
tions of individual names of the participants in the incident 9 Admissi-
bility of their testimony was upheld by the court. ' The court not only
held that "[t]he fact of hypnosis, if disclosed to the jury, may affect the
credibility of evidence, but not its admissibility,"' ' but went significantly
further. On the issue of laying a proper foundation for the reliability of
hypnosis, the court stated that "[plretrial hypnosis of witnesses [has been]
permitted in this circuit in both criminal and civil cases .... In jurisdic-
tions in which the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed evidence is still
an open question, a foundation.., is no doubt necessary." ' 2 Because the
technique had been accepted in Wyller, "there [was] no need for a foun-
dation concerning the nature and effects of hypnosis." ' 3
While the decision in Awkard represents a significant pronouncement
with respect to the necessity of laying a foundation for the use of hyp-
notically induced testimony, a recent North Carolina case shows a will-
" Note, Present Recollection, supra note 6, at 368-69.
Although quoting Kline [523 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974)] to the effect that "[the
witness] was present and personally saw and heard the occurrences," the court
disregarded the fact that in McQueen the only evidence that the witness was
actually present came from her own hypnotically refreshed testimony, whereas
in Kline, the witness' presence was independently established.... Although
purporting to rely on Jorgensen, the North Carolina Court admitted the pro-
cedure employed by the hypnotist in McQueen was never entered into evidence.
The court cited Harding without any indication of why or how that case ap-
plied to McQueen.
Id.
295 N.C. at 120, 244 S.E.2d at 428.
'5 Id.
"Id,
" 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 669.
"Id.
IDO Id.
"' Id.
102 Id- (citation omitted).
103 Id.
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ingness to go much farther. Ku Klux Klan and Nazi Party members were
accused of murdering five Communist Worker's Party members during
a rally in a black neighborhood in Greensboro, North Carolina. °4 Laura
Blumenthal, a news reporter, was an eyewitness for the state in the trial."5
Unknown to the defense, Blumenthal was hypnotized prior to trial to
refresh her memory of the incident."' After learning of the hypnosis, the
defense made a motion for a mistrial."° The trial judge cited State v.
McQueen and said that the question was one of credibility rather than
admissibility. 08 Stibsequently, the court admitted into evidence a ninety-
minute videotape of the hypnosis session, not only for the purpose of prov-
ing lack of suggestion, but as substantive evidence as well.0 9 The jury
could "consider it [the tape] as if Blumenthal had been testifying under
oath.""' Thus, the court's action is tantamount to allowing in-court hyp-
nosis to be admitted into evidence, which has never been done before
by an American court."'
AN ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS REJECTING
HYPNOTICALLY INDUCED TESTIMONY
Cases Reversing the Trend on the Basis of Frye
The reliability of hypnosis as an aid to memory recall appeared to be
established in the legal community by 1979;"' however, beginning in 1980,
a widespread re-evaluation of pretrial hypnosis began. Reversal of the
trend toward the admission of hypnotically induced testimony was led
by the Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Before determining the existence of probable cause in a prosecution
for alleged aggravated assault and criminal sexual conduct in the first
degree, the Minnesota trial court certified to the state supreme court
the question of the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony in the
case of State v. Mack."' The supreme court held that a witness previously
hypnotized could not testify in criminal proceedings concerning subject
" The Daily Times-News (Burlington, North Carolina), August 18, 1980, at 1, col. B. At
this juncture, the writer has found no other source to cite other than local newspaper
accounts of the trial. There is no published opinion of the case.
' The Daily Times-News (Burlington, North Carolina), August 20, 1980, at 1, col. B. Allow-
ing the tape as substantive evidence is tantamount to allowing in-court use of hypnosis,
which has never been permitted in an American court.
106 Id-
10 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
UO Id.
'"See generally Note, Hypnosis in Court, supra note 6.
"' See text accompanying notes 46-103 supra.
- Minn. -, 292 N.W.2d 764 (1980).
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matter adduced from pretrial hypnosis."' The court accepted the defen-
dant's argument that the admissibility of the testimony was governed
by the general scientific reliability test announced in Frye v. United
States."' The test demands that "the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to have gained acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.""" The Mack court cited Greenfield
v. Commonwealth"7 for support and applied the strict standard of Frye
to reject the testimony induced by pretrial hypnosis."8
The Arizona Supreme Court's recent pronouncement about the reli-
ability of hypnosis illustrates a lack of understanding about the technique.
State v. LaMountain"9 was similar to the Mack case in its holding. While
the court rejected the use of hypnotically induced testimony, it did not
expressly follow the Frye test. However, for the purpose of this analysis,
it can be reasonably inferred from the language of the decision that the
case can be grouped with those cases rejecting the use of pretrial hyp-
nosis on the basis of Frye. The court said that "[a]lthough ... hypnosis
is a useful tool in the investigative stage, we do not feel the state of the
science (or art) has been shown to be such as to admit testimony which
may have developed as a result of hypnosis."" Given the facts of the
case, the rejection of the testimony induced by pretrial hypnosis was pro-
per. The two basic requirements for hypnotically induced testimony were
not met; first, the hypnotist had been practicing hypnosis for only about
a year, and second, the state failed to lay a foundation for the reliability
of hypnosis."'
The Court of Appeals of Michigan also rejected the use of hypnotically
It' Id. at - 292 N.W.2d at 765.
115 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
"' Id. at 1014.
"' 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974) (court utilized analysis similar to that in Frye to
hold that hypnotic evidence was not admissible in criminal prosecution).
"' Under the Frye rule, the results of mechanical or scientific testing are not
admissible unless the testing has developed or improved to the point where
experts in the field widely share the view that the results are scientifically
reliable as accurate. Although hypnotically-adduced 'memory' is not strictly
analogous to the result of mechanical testing, we are persuaded that the Frye
rule is equally applicable in this context, where the best expert testimony
indicates that no expert can determine whether memory retrieved by hyp-
nosis, or any part of that memory, is truth, falsehood, or confabulation-a
filling of gaps with fantasy. Such results are not scientifically reliable as
accurate.
Minn. at - , 292 N.W.2d at 768.
'1' 125 Ariz. 547, 611 P.2d 551 (1980). The defendant was charged with first degree rape
and lascivious acts. Unable to identify the defendant in a photographic lineup, the victim
underwent hypnosis. After two sessions of hypnosis, the victim selected the defendant
from a photographic lineup and later made an in-court identification. The defendant was
convicted, and he appealed.
'2 Id. at 551, 611 P.2d at 555.
m See generally Teitelbaum, supra note 6; Note, Hypnosis in Court, supra note 6.
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induced testimony. In People v. Tait,'" the defendant appealed from a
conviction of assault with intent to commit murder."= The court failed
to distinguish hypnosis from lie detectors and voiceprints by holding that
the test "required that general scientific recognition be established by
testimony of disinterested and impartial experts or disinterested scien-
tists whose livelihood was not intimately connected with the technique."' "4
Like the LaMountain court, the Michigan court used language closely
paralleling that of the Frye test.
Given the facts of the case, the decision in Tait was proper. The witness,
a deputy sheriff, was hypnotized by the prosecuting attorney, who was
an amateur hypnotist.25 On that set of facts, even jurisdictions generally
accepting hypnotically induced testimony would have refused to admit
this testimony because of a lack of procedural safeguards. A further pro-
cedural flaw occurred when defense counsel attempted to examine the
witness who had undergone pretrial hypnosis. The trial judge ordered
both parties not to mention hypnosis in the presence of the jury.2  The
trial court also refused to give the jury "instructions on the unreliability
of hypnosis and the capability of a witness to fantasize while under
hypnosis. ' " As a result, the jury never knew that the witness had been
hypnotized and that his memory had been refreshed through hypnosis.
In the opinion of the court, this represented reversible error.12
After a thorough analysis of the issue and citation to all the case law
and literature, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v.
Nazarovitch" rejected the use of hypnotically induced testimony. Although
the court applied the Frye test,' the opinion suggested that, given the
right fact situation, hypnotically induced testimony might be admitted. 3'
The result in Nazarovitch was correct because there was no record of
the subject's memory prior to hypnosis, both hypnotists were secured
by the police authorities, the questioning was weighted in favor of the
- Mich. App. -, 297 N.W.2d 853 (1980).
Id. at __ 297 N.W.2d at 854.
" Id. at -' 297 N.W.2d 't 857. The court cited the case of People v. Barbara, 400
Mich. 352, 255 N.W.2d 171 (1977), which set the rule for lie detectors and voiceprints, as
supplying the rule for hypnosis also. - Mich. App. at -, 297 N.W.2d at 857. The language
of the test is not unlike the Frye test enunciated in the Mack case. Id. at - 297 N.W.2d
at 856-57.
1 2 - Mich. App. at , 297 N.W.2d at 855. For a criticism of partial hypnotists, see
Dilloff, supra note 7, at 19-20. See also - Minn. at - 292 N.W.2d at 771 n.14 (affidavit
of Dr. Orne).
- Mich. App. at -, 297 N.W.2d at 855.
12 Id. at -' 297 N.W.2d at 856.
Id. at -, 297 N.W.2d at 857. But see United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th
Cir. 1979) (when admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony is no longer an open ques-
tion, no foundation for reliability is necessary and jury does not have to be informed of
use of hypnosis).
1 __ Pa. -, 436 A.2d 170 (1981).
Id. at - , 436 A.2d at 172-73.
'3' See id. at - 436 A.2d at 178.
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prosecution, and the subject had taken a hallucinogenic drug during the
event she was trying to reraember. 1 These facts do not present the kind
of situation in which pretrial hypnosis should be accepted.
Should Frye Apply?: The Lack of Sound Legal Reasoning
In the years between 1968 and 1980, hypnotically induced testimony
fared well in several state courts and the Ninth Circuit; however, 1980
proved to be the year of re-evaluation. Some courts depended on the Frye
test and similar standards, while others rejected hypnotically induced
testimony in opinions that were "often devoid of legal reasoning or
analysis."''" Commentators have argued that the use of the general scien-
tific reliability test for hypnotically induced testimony is erroneous."' The
primary ground for the inadmissibility of results from lie detector tests
(the subject matter of Frye"u) is that the results are offered for the pur-
pose of ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the accused."' Lie detector
tests place factfinding responsibility in the hands of the machine and the
examiner, yet procedural safeguards for the tests are not available. 37
Because the province of the jury is invaded, one hundred percent reliability
is required under the strict standard articulated in Frye 3"
The use of truth serums has the same effect on the role of the jury
in the trial process. It is impossible to protect against problems with the
reliability of truth serums for several reasons: first, each human body
has a different chemistry and is subject to different reactions to the serum;
second, the interrogation is done in private; third, equal depths of influence
cannot be maintained; fourth, no adequate tests are available to measure
depth of influence; and fifth, cross-examination is impossible because the
condition cannot be maintained for long periods of time.139 It is the ex-
aminer who must be entrusted with the duty of factfinding when truth
serums are used."" As is the case with lie detectors, because the function
of the jury as finders of fact is abrogated, one hundred percent reliability
of the technique should be required. The connotation inherent in the names
"truth serum" and "lie detector" is that the function of these techniques
is to establish the truth of matters asserted. Such a function cannot be
imputed to pretrial hypnosis.
"1 Id. at -, 436 A.2d at 177. On this set of facts, not even the Ninth Circuit would
be likely to admit the testimony.
' Foster & Spector, supra note 6, at 579.
' See generally note 6 supra.
'u 293 F. at 1013.
'3 See generally Foster & Spector, supra note 6; Teitelbaum, supra. note 6, at 211.
137 See Teitelbaum, supra note 6, at 211.
138 Id.
'1 Id. at 211-12.
140 Id.
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In Mack the court stated that "no expert can determine whether
memory retrieved by hypnosis ... is truth, falsehood, or confabulation.""'
One of the most widely cited critics of pretrial hypnosis asserts that
"psychiatric and psychological professionals highly skilled in the use of
hypnosis for therapeutic purposes are apt to be naive in recognizing its
limitations as a 'truth-telling' technique."" Unlike Mack, the court in State
v. McQueen' recognized the critical distinction between hypnosis and lie
detector tests. The McQueen court said: "Here we are concerned with
the admissibility of testimony which the witness says is her present
recollection ... ,the credibility of her testimony being left for the jury's
appraisal." '' McQueen and some commentators"' have observed that hyp-
nosis does not seek to establish truth of matters asserted and thus take
away the role of the jury.
The availability of procedural safeguards supports a less restrictive
standard for hypnotically induced testimony than for evidence derived
from lie detector tests and truth serums for three reasons: first, an ex-
planation of the dangers of suggestion associated with hypnosis may be
given by the hypnotist; second, there is an opportunity for cross-
examination; and third, the witness is testifying from his own substan-
tive knowledge, if the procedure is conducted properly."8 In his affidavit,
cited in the Mack case, Dr. Orne, the expert on hypnosis, made it clear
that the most important safeguard against suggestion is the strict monitor-
ing of all contact between the hypnotist and the subject."7 It is the hyp-
notist who is in the position to make the procedure highly suggestive
or not suggestive at all."8 Complete objectivity on the part of the hyp-
notist is required; thus, the hypnotist should be a disinterested party who
does not communicate personal attitudes to the subject at any time before
or after the hypnotic sessions. Most important, his questions should never
suggest an answer."9
When the court in State v. LaMountain"° used the words "science" and
"art" interchangeably to refer to hypnosis,' a serious misconception of
the technique was revealed. The comments of Dr. Orne make it clear that
hypnosis is no mystical, magical spell that engulfs the hypnotized subject
and controls his every thought. The subject retains thoughts and expres-
4 __ Minn. at -, 292 N.W.2d at 768.
' Diamond, supra note 7, at 313-14.
143 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978).
Id. at 121, 244 S.E.2d at 429.
See generally Teitelbaum, supra note 6; Note, Hypnosis in Court, supra note 6.
.6 See Note, Hypnosis in Court, supra note 6, at 278.
.. See - Minn. at -, 292 N.W.2d at 771 n.14 (affidavit of Dr. Orne).
648 See id.
. See id.
' 125 Ariz. 547, 611 P.2d 551 (1980).
11 See text at note 120 supra.
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sions of will that are present in the individual's character.152 If the hyp-
notist tries to suggest an idea that is foreign to the subject, the sugges-
tion will, most likely, be refused."n Hypnosis, because it is not a spell
that completely controls the subject, is a cooperative effort between the
hypnotist and the subject; thus, if the hypnotist tries to take advantage
of the subject, the trance could be terminated by the subject.'M
Instead of making broad pronouncements about the reliability of hyp-
nosis, as the court did in Mack and LaMountain, courts should engage
in a case-by-case analysis of the admissibility of testimony induced by
pretrial hypnosis." In each case the court should consider whether a pro-
per foundation has been laid for pretrial hypnosis and whether the pro-
per procedural safeguards have been used to ensure that the province
of the jury has not been invaded.15 Since medicine is an inexact science,
medical testimony is a calculated opinion based on evidence obtained by
the use of approved methods of investigation."5 7 Therefore, "[t]o require
a showing of greater accuracy than the science is capable of producing
is unreasonable.""u If it can be shown that hypnosis is approved by the
medical profession and that the results of hypnosis have reasonable
medical accuracy, "the courts should not hesitate to allow such testimony
if invoked by a qualified hypnotist." '59
The reasoning of the court in People v. Tait6' illustrates the lack of
sound legal reasoning with respect to admissibility of hypnotically induced
testimony. The court cited one other Michigan case that rejected the use
of testimony influenced by pretrial hypnosis, People v. Hangsleben.'
Although the court gave no indication as to how heavily it relied on
Hangsleben, it also failed to note that the facts of the case were
distinguishable from the facts of Tait. Hangsleben involved an attempt
by the defendant to introduce statements made "while under hypnosis
to establish the truth of the statements he made while in a hypnotic
trance.""I There was no attempt in Tait to introduce any statements made
while under hypnosis. The witness had his memory refreshed by hyp-
I" See L. WOLBERG, sitpra note 9, at 63.
15 I& at 61.
1U I&
"l Compare People v. Tait, 99 Mich. App. 19, 297 N.W.2d 853 (1980), with Commonwealth
v. Nazarovitch, - Pa. _, 436 A.2d 170 (1981). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Nazarovitch, for example, implied that it would deal with the admissibility of hypnotically
induced testimony on a case-by-case basis by not establishing a per se rule against ad-
missibility, id. at _, 436 A.2d at 178.
15 M. Teitelbaum, supra note 6, at 212.
See id.
Id-
99 Mich. App. 19, 297 N.W.2d 853 (1980).
86 Mich. App. 718,273 N.W.2d 539 (1978), cd in 99 Mich. App. at 25,297 N.W.2d at 856.
56 99 Mich. App. at 25, 297 N.W.2d at 856.
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nosis and testified from his own present recollection. Therefore,
Hangsleben did not apply and should not have been cited for support.
The Retreat by Maryland: A Questionable Interpretation
Perhaps the greatest blow to the defense of hypnotically induced
testimony is the recent retreat by the Maryland Court of Special Ap-
peals. In Polk v. State,163 the Maryland court reversed the defendant's
conviction of offenses stemming from sexual misconduct. On appeal the
defendant alleged "that hypnotically induced testimony is per se inadmissi-
ble, and ... that in this case the alleged victim's testimony was hyp-
notically induced by an unqualified police investigator."1" That hypnotically
induced testimony was not, as a rule, inadmissible had been established
by the Maryland court in Harding. However, after a brief review of the
holding in Harding and the cases subsequent to that decision which ad-
mitted hypnotically induced testimony, the court noted that "[t]en years
after our decision in Harding. . . . the Court of Appeals of Maryland
adopted for the first time the now familiar 'general acceptance rule' enun-
ciated in Frye v. United States.' The adoption of the Frye test for general
reliability in the 1978 case of Reed v. State66 was deemed to compel a
re-evaluation of the use of hypnotically induced testimony. Polk not only
cited the Minnesota and Arizona Supreme Courts, 67 but also followed their
application of the Frye rule. The court reversed the appellant's convic-
tion and remanded the case for a new trial.16 8
The result in Polk would invite less criticism if it could be reconciled
with the same court's decision in State v. Temoney,69 which also was de-
cided after the adoption of the Frye rule in that jurisdiction. In Temoney
the defendant was convicted of first degree rape, first degree sexual of-
fense, robbery with a deadly weapon, and carrying a dangerous weapon
openly with intent to injure. 171 On appeal, the defendant objected to the
48 Md. App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041 (1981).
'u Id. at 389, 427 A.2d at 1045. The defendant also contended that the state was im-
properly permitted to call the witness who had undergone hypnosis without exposing in
the evidence that hypnosis had been used, and that the defendant was improperly prevented
from calling his own expert to testify about hypnosis. Id. at 389, 427 A.2d at 1046.
16 Id. at 391, 427 A.2d at 1046-47 (citation omitted).
16 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978) (holding that testimony based on voiceprints is inad-
missible in Maryland). The court said that "before a scientific opinion will be received as
evidence at trial, the basis of that opinion must be shown to be generally accepted as reliable
within the expert's particular scientific field." Id. at 381, 391 A.2d at 368. The Court of
Appeals in Reed was divided four to three.
1 48 Md. App. at 392-94, 427 A.2d at 1047-48 (citing Mack and Mena).
' 48 Md. App. at 396, 427 A.2d at 1048.
165 45 Md. App. at 569, 414 A.2d 240 (1980).
17. Id. at 570, 414 A.2d at 241.
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trial court's admission of testimony induced by hypnosis. 1 In the opinion
of the court, "[tihe trial court did not err ... in admitting this testimony.""
Relying on Harding, the court said the fact that the witness "achieved
her present knowledge after being hypnotized concerns the question of
the weight of the evidence which the trier of facts, in this case the jury,
must decide."'' 3
It is interesting that the appellee in Temoney relied on the decision
in Reed, as did the appellant in Polk one year later; however, the court
in Temoney found the reliance on Reed "somewhat misplaced."'"4 Refus-
ing to give the decision in Reed the broad reading advocated by the ap-
pellee, the court stated: "Assuming that the scientific validity of the hyp-
nosis technique is in controversy, while such would preclude the admis-
sion of expert opinion deduced from the technique .... it would not also
preclude ... the admission of a description of the procedure used to hyp-
notize the victim or the hypnotically induced testimony itself."'' 5 On the
basis of this reading of the Reed opinion, the court held that the viability
of Harding was not vitiated. In light of the Temoney opinion, the court's
holding in Polk is questionable.
In Polk the court implied that the case was the first time, since the
decision in Reed, that the issue of the general acceptability of hypnosis
as an aid to memory recall was directly before the courtY.7 However, one
of the appellee's contentions in Temoney was that "'[h]ypnosis ha[d] not
been established as an approved scientific method ... ' "v under the stan-
dard of Reed. In the course of reasoning that Reed was limited in its ap-
plication, the Temoney court made the assumption that "the scientific
validity of the hypnosis technique [was] in controversy .... "178 In a foot-
note, the Polk court said that the applicability of Frye was raised in
Temoney, but was limited to the admissibility of expert testimony based
on hypnosis;'79 however, Temoney held that Reed "would not ... preclude
... a description of the procedure ... or the hypnotically induced testimony
itself."1' Not only was the issue of the scientific technique directly before
the court in Temoney, the issue was settled by the court's narrow inter-
pretation of Reed. It appears that in Polk the Maryland court misinter-
preted the issue and the holding in the Temoney case.
171 Id.
"' Id. at 576, 414 A.2d at 244.
173 Id.
17 Id.
"I Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted).
171 45 Md. App. at 577-78, 414 A.2d at 244 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
'u Id. at 577, 414 A.2d at 244.
178 Id The court also noted that the hypnotist testified that there was such a controversy
about the validity of hypnosis. Id. n.6.
" 48 Md. App. at 392, 427 A.2d at 1047 n.13A.
45 Md. App. at 577-78, 414 A.2d at 244 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
1982]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
TOWARD A UNIFORM SET OF PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
Only one case, State v. Hurd,18" ' has collected and adopted the most im-
portant procedural safeguards for the use of hypnotically induced
testimony. The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Hurd affirmed the lower
court's adoption and application of a set of procedural safeguards for the
use of hypnotically induced testimony." The appeal involved the trial
court's exclusion from evidence testimony induced by pretrial hypnosis."
The trial court distinguished the traditional use of the Frye test of general
scientific reliability by stating that "[ilt must be conceded that as a tech-
nique or procedure for determining 'truth,' hypnosis would fail the Frye
test of general acceptance in the scientific community."'"4 However, the
trial court went on to say that this inability to pass the Frye test did
not mean that such testimony should always be rejected.185 Since hyp-
nosis is an accepted technique in the medical community and allows sub-
jects to regain lost memory, the trial court said that "[i]n this limited
sense hypnosis has met the test imposed by Frye.""'
Referring to the trial court's analysis of the Frye rule, the New Jersey
Supreme Court stated:
Unlike the courts in Mena ... and Mack .... the court below did
not demand, as a precondition of admissibility, that hypnosis be
generally accepted as a means of reviving truthful or historically ac-
curate recall. We think this was correct. The purpose of using hyp-
nosis is not to obtain truth, as a polygraph or 'truth serum' is suppos-
ed to do. Instead, hypnosis is employed as a means of overcoming
amnesia and restoring the memory of a witness."3
If hypnosis is employed in this fashion, testimony of a witness subjected
to pretrial hypnosis is as reliable as the testimony of any other witness."
Since the purpose of pretrial hypnosis is not to prove the truth of mat-
ters asserted, the supreme court was "satisfied that the use of hypnosis
to refresh memory satisfies the Frye standard in certain instances.""89
That there exist potential problems with the use of pretrial hypnosis was
fully recognized, but the court felt that "a rule of per se inadmissibility
[was] unnecessarily broad and [would] result in the exclusion of evidence
that [would be] as trustworthy as other eyewitness testimony.""' Although
the reliability of the particular procedures used in each case may be
86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
Id. at 549, 432 A.2d at 90.
Id. at 529, 432 A.2d at 88.
173 N.J. Super. 333, 361, 414 A.2d 291, 305 (1980).
195 Id
I !d.
" 86 N.J. at 537, 432 A.2d at 92 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
18 86 N.J. at 538, 432 A.2d at 92 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
189 Id.
6 N.J. at 541, 432 A.2d at 94.
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challenged by the introduction of expert testimony, "the opponent may
not attempt to prove the general unreliability of hypnosis."19 '
In order to provide guidelines for the case-by-case evaluation of the
hypnotic procedures used, the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the
following procedural safeguards:
First, a psychiatrist or psychologist experienced in the use of hyp-
nosis must conduct the session....
Second, the professional conducting the hypnotic session should be
independent of and not regularly employed by the prosecutor, in-
vestigator or defense....
Third, any information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement
personnel or the defense prior to the hypnotic session must be re-
corded, either in writing or another suitable form....
Fourth, before inducing hypnosis the hypnostist should obtain from
the subject a detailed description of the facts as the subject remembers
them....
Fifth, all contacts between the hypnotist and the subject must be
recorded. The use of videotape, the only effective record of visual
cues, is strongly encouraged but not mandatory.
Sixth, only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during
any phase of the hypnotic session, including the pre-hypnotic testing
and the post-hypnotic interview."2
The procedural safeguards adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court
are appropriate. These procedures provide an excellent opportunity for
courts in other jurisdictions to resolve open questions concerning the use
of hypnotically induced testimony. However, while the New Jersey
Supreme Court would only strongly suggest the use of videotape as a
means of recording all contacts between the hypnotist and the subject,
videotaping should be made mandatory. The court and the jury, in most
instances, must rely exclusively on the testimony of the hypnotist con-
cerning the hypnotic session. In the Nazi-Klan trial, 93 for example, as a
result of the admission of the videotape, the court and the jury could
decide whether the procedure was free of suggestion without relying total-
ly on the testimony of the hypnotist. Moreover, the demeanor of the
witness could be judged."4 Therefore, there are considerable grounds for
making the use of videotape mandatory.
CONCLUSION
The case law reveals that the relationship between hypnosis and the
legal community has progressed remarkably since 1897. Because of dis-
agreement among the state courts over the standard to use in judging
' Id. at 543, 432 A.2d at 95.
" Id. at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 97 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
'" See text and accompanying notes 104-111 supra.
'" See id.
1982]
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the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony, however, the progress
of the last eighty-five years may be in grave danger.
Starting with Harding, and continuing with the sound reasoning of
Hurd, the issue with respect to hypnotically induced testimony has been
framed accurately in terms of credibility rather than admissibility. What
is needed is a uniform set of procedural safeguards capable of restoring
consistency and reasoning to opinions on the subject. Hurd has provided
a foundation for such uniformity. Building on the meager case law deal-
ing with pretrial hypnosis and an objective analysis of the applicability
of the Frye rule, Hurd formulated a set of procedural safeguards that
should be adopted as a universal standard for the admissibility of hyp-
notically induced testimony. It remains to be seen whether other courts
will follow the New Jersey Supreme Court's effort to bring order to the
chaos concerning the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony.
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